

Does Technology Substitute for Nurses?

--- Staffing Decisions in Nursing Homes



Susan Feng Lu, Purdue University

Huaxia Rui, University of Rochester

Abraham Seidmann, University of Rochester

Agenda


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- **Motivation**
- Theoretical Analysis
- Data and Identification
- Empirical Results
- Conclusions

Automation through Information Technology

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Automation threatens all manner of workers, from drivers to waiters to nurses.” **Bill Gates, 2014**



software will eat the world
Marc Andreessen, 2012



Automation may be destroying jobs faster than it's creating new ones.
Eric Brynjolfsson, 2013

Motivation

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Advances in IT are changing healthcare delivery by bring digitization and automation into the industry.



Research Question (Broad)

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**How will IT-enabled automation
affect
healthcare employment?**

Technology and Nurse Labor Markets

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“the rollout of electronic health records systems is identified as one of the dangerous trends that nurses must know about.”

“... if this sounds like the computer is taking over your independent nursing judgement and maybe ultimately your job, that’s because it is.

--- National Nurse

Research Question

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Does technology substitute for nurses?

Relatively simple structure of labor provision

Relatively homogeneous services: chronic care

Nursing Homes in the United States

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- A nursing home is a place for people who do not need to be in a hospital but can no longer be cared for at home.
- 2011 spending on nursing home care: \$111 billion
- Patient types
 - Short-term care patients (post-acute care)
 - Long-term care patients (chronic care)

Quality Mix

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- 60% of patients are Medicaid (daily rate \$140)
- 20% are Medicare patients for post-acute care (daily rate \$500)
- 20% are private-paying patients (daily rate \$300-400)

Vertical Differentiation

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- The whole industry chases lucrative patients.
- The entire nursing home industry is competitive.
- Many studies find that there is a strong relationship between poor quality and a high percentage of Medicaid residents in nursing homes.

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Model Setup

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- A nursing home's staffing problem:

$$\max_s V(s) = R(q, \theta) - w * s$$

Vertical Position

Wages (\$)

Staffing Level

Quality Level

Revenue (\$)/Pt

- Parameterization:

Care Quality

$$Q(r, k) = rk,$$

$$R(q, \theta) = 1 - \theta e^{-A\theta q}. \quad \{\partial R / \partial q > 0, \partial^2 R / \partial q^2 < 0\}$$

Staff-to-patient ratio

Technology Level

$$0 < \underline{\theta} < \bar{\theta} < \sqrt{\frac{we^2}{Ak}}.$$

Model Analysis

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Lemma:

The optimal staffing level s^* , the optimal quality level q^* , and the resulting average revenue per patient for a nursing home with vertical position θ are given below:

$$s^* = \frac{1}{Ak\theta} \ln \frac{Ak\theta^2}{w}, \quad q^* = \frac{1}{A\theta} \ln \frac{Ak\theta^2}{w}, \quad R(q^*, \theta) = 1 - \frac{w}{Ak\theta}.$$

Proposition 1:

The optimal staffing level s^* , the optimal quality level q^* , and the average revenue per patient $R(q^*, \theta)$ are increasing in θ .

Model Analysis

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Proposition 2:

The optimal quality level q^* and the average revenue per patient $R(q^*, \theta)$ are increasing in the automation level k .

Proposition 3:

An increase in automation level leads to **an increase** of a nursing home's staffing level if $\theta < \sqrt{\frac{we}{Ak}}$, but it leads to **a decrease** of a nursing home's staffing level if $\theta > \sqrt{\frac{we}{Ak}}$.

Why?

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- Automation -> More productive employees -> hire more!
- Demand is not infinite -> substitution effect -> hire less!
- Low vertical position: revenue expansion strategy
- High vertical position: cost reduction strategy

Hypotheses

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- **Hypothesis 1:** An increase in automation level leads to a *decrease* in staff-to-patient ratio for a nursing home with a high vertical position.
- **Hypothesis 2:** An increase in automation level leads to an *increase* in staff-to-patient ratio for a nursing home with a low vertical position.

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Data

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❑ Data Sources


- ❑ The Online Survey Certificate and Reporting Database (OSCAR) from 2006 to 2012
- ❑ The Health Information Systems Society (HIMSS) from 2005 to 2011

❑ Key Variables:

- ❑ Staff-to-Patient Ratio: staff hours per patient day (HPRD) for licensed nurses (LNs)
- ❑ Vertical Position

Adoption Rates over Years

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Econometrics and Identification

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- Average Effect:

$$S_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 IT_{i,t-1} + \alpha_2 X_{it} + \alpha_3 Z_{ct} + \alpha_4 State_s * Year_t + \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

- Heterogeneous Effect:

$$S_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 IT_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 IT_{i,t-1} * High\ End_i + \beta_3 X_{it} + \beta_4 Z_{ct} + \beta_5 State_s * Year_t + \beta_i + \beta_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

- Endogeneity Issues

- The adoption of CPOE is not randomly assigned.

Instrumental Variable (IV)

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- We construct an instrumental variable, *hospital_CPOE*, describing the yearly hospital CPOE adoption rates in the local market where we define a county as a market.
 - Inclusion criteria
 - ✦ First stage: 0.552 (p-value <0.001)
 - ✦ Weak IV problem:
 - The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistics is 622.17, allowing us to easily reject the null hypothesis.
 - Exclusion criteria
 - ✦ nurse labor market
 - ✦ nursing home staffing

The Impact of Hospital CPOE on Nurse Labor Market


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| Dependent Variable | State Nurse Supply | | State Hospital Nurse Supply | | Wage: Hourly Rate (cent) | |
|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|
| Nurse Type | RNs | LPNs | RNs | LPNs | RNs | LPNs |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Hosp_CPOE | -0.001 (0.001) | -0.0002 (0.001) | -0.002 (0.001) | -0.00001 (0.001) | -200.881 (141.867) | -531.14 (381.591) |
| State Fixed Effects | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Year Fixed Effects | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Observations | 357 | 354 | 357 | 354 | 356 | 355 |
| R-squared | 0.089 | 0.026 | 0.095 | 0.028 | 0.279 | 0.082 |

The adoption of hospital CPOE has no effect on nurse labor market.

The Impact of Hospital CPOE Adoption on Nursing Home Staffing

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The adoption of hospital CPOE has no effect on nurse home staffing.

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Average Effect on Staffing

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| Dependent Variable: LN HPRD | Average Effect | | |
|--------------------------------|--|---------------------|-------------------|
| | OLS (1) | First Stage (2) | 2SLS (3) |
| CPOE | 0.006 (0.019) | | -0.001 (0.039) |
| IV: Hospital_CPOE | | 0.552*** (0.022) | |
| Nursing Home Dummies | Y | Y | Y |
| Year Dummies | Y | Y | Y |
| Individual State Linear Trends | Y | Y | Y |
| Time-varying Controls | Y | Y | Y |
| Weak Identification Test | Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic: 622.17*** | | |
| Observations | 12313 | 12313 | 12250 |
| Within R-squared | 0.044 | 0.272 | 0.044 |
| Number of provider | 2119 | 2119 | 2056 |

The adoption of CPOE has no effect on nursing home staffing on average.

Heterogeneous Effect by Vertical Position

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| Dependent Variable: Hours per patient Day | Licensed Nurses | | | Registered Nurses | |
|--|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | Minimum LNs | | | Minimum RNs | |
| | OLS (1) | 2SLS (2) | 2SLS (3) | 2SLS (4) | 2SLS (5) |
| CPOE | 0.106*** (0.036) | 0.282*** (0.062) | 0.145*** (0.046) | 0.154*** (0.040) | 0.073** (0.029) |
| CPOE * Position | -0.065** (0.029) | -0.172*** (0.042) | | -0.145*** (0.044) | |
| CPOE * High End | | | -0.255*** (0.071) | | -0.109** (0.047) |
| Nursing Home Dummies | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Year Dummies | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| State Linear Trends | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| F test: CPOE+CPOE* High End | | | -0.110** | | -0.036* |
| Observations | 12,313 | 12,250 | 12,250 | 12,250 | 12,250 |
| Within R-squared | 0.046 | 0.040 | 0.041 | 0.057 | 0.058 |
| Number of provider | 2,119 | 2,056 | 2,056 | 2,056 | 2,056 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by nursing home

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The adoption of CPOE has opposite effects on staffing decisions.

Robustness Checks

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| Dependent Variable: | Alternative Measures, Controls and Specifications | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------|---|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | Relative Position | IV NH | IV HSA | IV HRR | Control supply/wage | Control other IT Apps | GMM | Diff-in-Diff (OLS) |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| LN HPRD (2SLS) | | | | | | | | |
| CPOE | 0.221*** (0.070) | 0.127* (0.072) | 0.103** (0.044) | 0.216** (0.110) | 0.146*** (0.046) | 0.147*** (0.050) | 0.146*** (0.046) | 0.049*** (0.017) |
| CPOE * High End | -0.258*** (0.078) | -0.393*** (0.116) | -0.183*** (0.063) | -0.443*** (0.149) | -0.257*** (0.071) | -0.251*** (0.071) | -0.255*** (0.072) | -0.082** (0.037) |
| Time-Varying Controls | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Nursing Home Dummies | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Year Dummies | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| State Linear Trends | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Observations | 12,250 | 12,408 | 10,448 | 10,459 | 12,237 | 12,237 | 12,067 | 12,313 |
| Within R-squared | 0.041 | 0.032 | 0.04 | 0.026 | 0.041 | 0.042 | 0.041 | 0.044 |
| Number of Providers | 2,056 | 2,061 | 1,995 | 1,997 | 2,056 | 2,056 | 2,041 | 2,119 |

Effect on Clinical Quality

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| Dependent Variable: Clinical Quality | Five Star Ratings | | |
|---|--|---------------------|-------------------|
| | Ratings on Quality Measures | | |
| | OLS (1) | First Stage (2) | 2SLS (3) |
| CPOE | 0.008 (0.046) | | 0.198* (0.102) |
| IV: Hospital_CPOE | | 0.540*** (0.025) | |
| Nursing Home Dummies | Y | Y | Y |
| Year Dummies | Y | Y | Y |
| Individual State Linear Trends | Y | Y | Y |
| Time Varying Controls | Y | Y | Y |
| Weak Identification Test | Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic: 241.20*** | | |
| Observations | 8,634 | 8,632 | 8,489 |
| Within R-squared | 0.057 | 0.28 | 0.054 |
| Number of provider | 2,004 | 2002 | 1,859 |

The adoption of CPOE improves patient clinical outcomes as well.

Effects on Patient Composition

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| Dependent Variable: Log of Daily Admissions | Patient Types | | | |
|--|------------------|-------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| | Total Admission | | Medicaid Admission | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| CPOE | 0.006 (0.086) | 0.138 (0.147) | -0.147** (0.072) | -0.201* (0.112) |
| CPOE * Position | | -0.079 (0.057) | | 0.038 (0.052) |
| Nursing Home Dummies | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Year Dummies | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| State Linear Trends | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Observations | 11,017 | 11,017 | 9,548 | 9,548 |
| Centered R-squared | 0.282 | 0.282 | 0.055 | 0.054 |
| Number of provider | 1,880 | 1,880 | 1,630 | 1,630 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by nursing home

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1



The adoption of CPOE decreases the admissions of Medicaid patients by 14.7%.

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Key Findings

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- When adopting CPOE:
 - LN staffing level:
 - ✦ decreases by 5.8% in high-end nursing homes
 - ✦ increases by 7.6% in low-end homes
- Driving Force:
 - Interplay of two competing effects of automation on LN:
 - ✦ substitution of technology for labor
 - ✦ leveraging of complementarity between technology and labor
- Other IT Outcomes:
 - Improves the ratings on clinical quality by 6.9%
 - Decreases admissions of less profitable residents by 14.7%

Strategic Take Away

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- **Managers**
 - Will your new IT be focusing on revenue expanding or on cost saving?
- **Individual Nurses**
 - Jobs will constantly shift
 - The vertical position of the nursing home determines the IT impact on employment prospects now
- **Policy makers**
 - Provide subsidies to encourage proper technology adoption!

Thank You!

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Q & A